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Abstract: This paper develops a model in which the interaction of Seniority of the C.E.O in the 
enterprise and the debt can be analyzed. Multiple securities arise as optimal in the model. This allows 
for a meaningful analysis of interaction effects between Seniority of the C.E.O in the enterprise and 
the debt for a panel of USA firms from 2000 to 2009. There is a predicted (positive) relationship 
between Seniority of the C.E.O in the enterprise and the debt. Finally, this paper uses the recent 
developments in the econometrics of non-stationary dynamic panels to reassess the relationship 
between Seniority of the C.E.O in the enterprise and the debt  
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1. Introduction 
The relationship between Seniority of the CEO in the enterprise and the debt is an 
important issue in the literature on corporate governance. One key aspect of the 
relationship between Seniority of the CEO and the debt is the direction of causality 
between them. The causal relationship between Seniority of the CEO and the debt 
has remained an empirically debatable issue in the field of finance, (i.e., Hart and 
Moore (1995), Berger, Ofek and Yermack (1997)). Over the Past three decades, a 
large number of studies have investigated the relationship between Seniority of the 
CEO and the debt. This is not surprising given the importance of the subject matter 
in finance; particularly the direction of causality has important implications for the 
entrenchment managerial. The focus of this paper is to examine the relationship 
between seniority of the CEO and the debt for a sample of 70 USA firms over the 
period of 2000-2009.  
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We organize this paper as follows. Section 2 describes data collection. Section 3 
describes methodology and empirical analysis. We conclude this paper in Section 
4. 
 
2. Data 
Our initial sample consists of over 100 firms listed on the USA Stock Exchange. 
We select the firms based on the availability of annual reports. As has been the 
practice in previous studies. We have also removed firms with negative book 
equity values. After these filtering procedures, our final sample consists of 70 firms 
during the time period of 2000-2009. We hand-collect data on board attributes and 
ownership concentration of individual companies from their respective annual 
reports for the financial year ending in 1999 or 2000. The source for other control 
variables is from DataStream. The Seniority of CEO variable is defined as the 
number of years in the enterprise.  
 
3. Methodology and Empirical Analysis 
3.1. The Model Proposed and Definition of Variables 
To investigate the relationship between Seniority of the CEO in the enterprise and 
the debt, we use the following model 
ANCI it = β0 + β1*L1 it+ β2*L2it + β3*TAILL it+ β4*AG it+ β5Qit + β6*S it+ e it   
(1) 
Where: 
ANCI: Seniority of the leader in his duties as C.E.O in the enterprise 
L1  : Total debt in book value 
L2  : Total debt in market value 
TAILL : Firm size 
AG : Firm age 
Q : Opportunities of growth                      
S : Structure of asset 
e : is the error term. 
The equation is to be considered as long run, or equilibrium relation. We may, of 
course, have more cointegrating relations involving firm size or firm age or 
opportunities of growth or structure of asset   as the dependent variable. Provided 
all variables involved are integrated of order one, or I (1), valid economic 
inferences can be drawn only if these relations are cointegrating relations, 
otherwise spurious inferences would result. Previous studies have examined 
cointegration on firm by firm basis by using time-series techniques, like Dickey-
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Fuller tests, and Johansen’s maximum likelihood cointegration methodology. 
However, given the short span of the data, we need to utilize information in the 
most efficient way, and make use of panel-based unit root and cointegration tests as 
well. In our empirical analysis, we will use pure time series tests and procedures as 
well, for comparison purposes. 
Further analysis indicates that the relation between debt yields and   the Seniority 
of C.E.O is not strictly linear but rather as the number of C.E.O years in the 
enterprise increases, debt costs decrease more rapidly. The evidence is consistent 
with the idea that large C.E.O Seniority positions reduce executive opportunism 
and generate incentives for greater managerial effort, However, to the extent that 
our control variables (e.g., firm size, firm age, structure of asset, etc.) do not fully 
capture credit risk, both the mitigation of agency problems and other factors 
inherent in debt pricing may contribute to the non-linear relation between CEO 
ownership and bond yields. 
Our research contributes to the literature in two important ways. First, we 
document that Seniority of C.E.O influences the cost of debt financing; suggesting 
that bondholders view managerial equity stakes as an important element in debt 
pricing. To best of our knowledge, this is the first study that examines the relation 
between Seniority of C.E.O and the cost of debt financing. Second, we add to the 
growing literature on the effects of Seniority of C.E.O on corporate activity. Our 
evidence is generally consistent with the notion that managerial equity holdings are 
associated with reduced executive shirking and with greater managerial diligence. 
Our study offers several contributions to the literature on the managerial 
entrenchment and corporate governance. We provide comprehensive sample 
evidence that debt and managerial entrenchment (the Seniority of C.E.O) are 
negatively related. This finding is contrary to the evidence presented in Garvey and 
Hanka (1999) and to several of the findings in Berger et al. (1997). We also show 
that this increased use of debt by entrenched managers is higher with higher 
ownership by large shareholders. Second, we employ robust econometric 
estimation techniques and tests that are able to address the concerns of endogenous 
choice of governance and financial policy. Therefore, we then suggest the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: the debt is positively associated with the Seniority of C.E.O  
 
3.2. The Panel Unit Root and the Panel Cointegration Tests  
The empirical results are presented in the following order. First, we examine the 
stationarity of the relevant series using panel unit root tests. Second, we explore 
whether there is any long-run relationship between Seniority of the CEO in the 
enterprise and the debt, using the panel co-integration technique. Third, we test the 
ACTA UNIVERSITATIS DANUBIUS                                         Vol 8, no. 2/2012 
 
 30 
validity of the absolute LOP using the FMOLS estimator. Finally, we investigate 
whether the long-run relationship varies with industry characteristics, such as the 
degree of product differentiation and market integration 
3.2.1. Panel Unit-Root Tests 
In recent years, a number of investigators, notably Levin, Lin and Chu (2002), and 
Im, Pesaran an Shin (2003) have developed panel-based unit root tests that are 
similar to tests carried out on a single series. 
In this section, the estimation results obtained from panel unit root tests and the 
equation (1) which shows the relationship between of the Seniority of C.E.O and 
the debt. Table 1.1 and Table 1.2 provide panel unit root tests results for 
investment and saving variables respectively. In the first Table, the LLC panel unit 
root tests are given. While the second table provides the IPS panel unit root test 
results. However, the first differences of these variables are stationary under the 
test. Hence, we conclude that these six variables are integrated of order 1 or I (1). 
Table 1.1. Results of panel unit root test (LLC test) 
Statistique ANCI L1 L2 Taill AG Q S 
Levin-Lin ADF-
stat 
2,734 -1,603 -2,608 2,130 3,609 -4,721 -0,255 
 
Table 1.2. Results of panel unit root test (IPS test) 
Statistique ANCI L1 L2 Taill AG Q S 
IPS ADF-stat 2,928 -5,331 -14,305 1,568 4,653 -10,168 
-1, 173 
 
3.2.2. Panel Cointegration Tests 
To determine whether a cointegrating relationship exits, the recently developed 
methodology proposed by Pedroni (1999) is employed. Basically, it employs four 
panel statistics and three group panel statistics to test the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration against the alternative hypothesis of cointegration 
These results are also displayed in Table 2. In this case, we see that for the whole 
period 2000- 2009, results are obtained that are similar to those without time 
dummies.  
The results of the cointegration analysis tests are presented in table 2. Those tests 
are developed by (Pedroni 1995, 1997, 2001). In this case, we see that for the 
whole period 2000- 2009, the results of the ADF tests are presented in the same 
table for the sake of comparison only. From results of Pedroni cointegration tests 
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we can notice that the whole of statistics are lower than breaking value of normal 
law for a threshold of 5% (-1,64).  The null hypothesis of no co-integration is 
rejected by all the seven panel statistics, suggesting the series are co-integrated, it 
can therefore be concluded that there is evidence of cointegration, which means 
that long-run relationship between of  the Seniority of C.E.O and the debt. 
Table 2. Results of cointegration test 
Statistique 
Panel  
v-stat 
Panel  
rho-
stat 
Panel 
PP-Stat 
Panel 
ADF-
stat 
Rho-
stat 
Group1 
PP-stat 
Group1 
Stat-ADF 
Group1 
ANCI, L1, L2, 
TAILL, AG, Q,S 
-
3,840 10,220 -5,450 1,567 13,814 -10,543 -4,398 
1
 it acts of the tests based on dimension BETWEEN 
 
3.3 FMOLS and DOLS 
When order of integration is decides than for the long run “elasiticities”, utilize the 
FMOLS method. FMOLS was originally designed first time by [Philips and 
Hansen, (1990); Pedroni, (1995, 2000); and, Philips and Moon, (1999)] to provide 
optimal estimates of Co-integration regressions (Bum and Jeon, 2005)., we use 
FMOLS methodology proposed by Phillips (1992) to estimate the idiosyncratic 
cointegration vectors and the modified FMOLS methodology proposed by Pedroni 
(2000) to estimate the panel's cointegration vector. FMOLS is superior to OLS 
when applied to heterogeneous panel with I (1) variables. This technique modifies 
least squares to account for serial correlation effects and test for the endogeneity in 
the regressors that result from the existence of a Co-integrating Relationships. 
Although this non-parametric approach is an elegant way to deal with nuisance 
parameters, it may be problematic especially in fairly very small samples. To apply 
the FMOLS for estimating long-run parameters, the condition that there exists a 
Cointegration relation between a set of I (1) variables is satisfied. There fore we 
have to confirm the presence of the unit root and test the Co-integrating relation. 
Standard tests of the presence of the unit root based on the work of Augmented 
Dicky Fuller (1979, 1981) used to investigate the degree of integration of 
concerned variables. According to Pedroni, these problems can be marked in 
heterogeneity presence. For our model estimated cointegrant vectors by FMOLS 
method is given by (t-student between brackets). The results are shown below:   
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4. Conclusion 
In this study, 70 firms were selected by employing panel data in order to test long 
run relation between the Seniority of the CEO in the enterprise and the debt by 
using cointegration tests. Firstly, unit root test were applied in order to test series 
stationarities. After testing unit root of series, cointegration tests were applied. 
Pedroni cointegration test resulted in that there was not a clear cointegration 
between series in the long run. The application of LL and IPS unit root tests shows 
that the whole of statistical series is affected of a unit root. It should be noted that 
the number of maximum lags is fixed at three. Selection of the numbers of lags is 
programmed by Pedroni. The checking of non stationary properties for all variables 
of panel leads us to study the existence of a long run relation between these 
variables. From results of cointegration tests of Pedroni we can notice that the 
whole of statistics are lower than the breaking value of normal law for a threshold 
of 5% (-1.64). So the whole of these tests requires the existence of a cointegration 
relation.  
 
5. References   
Berger P.G., Ofek E. and Yermack D. (1997). Managerial entrenchment and capital structure 
decisions. The Journal of  Finance, vol. 52(4), pp 1411-1438. 
Bum and Jeon, (2005). Demographic Changes and Economic Growth in Korea. SKKU ERI WP-
06/05. 
Dickey, D. A. and Fuller, W. A., (1979). Distribution of the estimators for autoregressive time series 
with a unit root. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 74, 427-31. 
Dickey, D. A. and Fuller, W. A., (1981). Likelihood ratio statistics for autoregressive time series with 
a unit root. Econometrica, 49, 1057-72. 
Garvey, G. and G. Hanka, (1999). .Capital structure and corporate control: The effect of antitakeover 
statutes on firm leverage. Journal of Finance, 54, 519-546. 
Hart, Oliver, and John Moore (1995). Debt and Seniority: An Analysis of the Role of Hard Claims in 
Constraining Management. American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 567-85, June. 1119–
58. 
Im, K. S., Pesaran, M. H. and Shin, Y. (2003). Testing for unit roots in heterogeneous panels. Journal 
of Econometrics 115, 53—74. 
Jensen M.C. (1986). Agency costs of free cash flow corporate finance and takeovers. American 
Economic Review, Vol n°76, pp 323-339. 
Jensen M.C. and Meckling W.H. (1976). Theory of the firm, managerial behavior, agency costs and 
ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, n°27, pp 305-360. 
Levin, A. & Lin, C. F. (1992). Unit root tests in panel data: asymptotic and finite sample properties. 
Department of Economics. University of California at San Diego, Discussion paper no. 92-93. 
Levin A. & Lin C. F. (1993). .Unit root tests in panel data: new results. University of California SD 
Discussion Paper 93-56, December. 
ŒCONOMICA 
 
 33
Levin, A., C. Lin, and C.J.  Chu. (2002). Unit Root Tests in Panel Data: Asymptotic and Finite 
Sample Properties. Journal of Econometrics 108: 1–24. 
Pedroni, Peter, (1995). Panel Cointegration: Asymptotic and Finite Sample Properties of Pooled Time 
Series Tests, With an Application to the PPP Hypothesis. Indiana University working papers in 
economics no. 95-013. 
Pedroni, Peter. (1999). Critical Values for Cointegration Tests in Heterogeneous Panels with Multiple 
Regressors. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 61: 653-670. 
Pedroni, Peter. (1999). Critical Values for Cointegration Tests in Heterogeneous Panels with Multiple 
Regressors. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 61: 653-670. 
Pedroni, Peter (2001). Purchasing power parity tests in cointegrated panels. Review of Economics and 
Statistics 83, 727-731. 
Pedroni, Peter. (2004). Panel Cointegration: Asymptotic and Finite Sample Properties of Pooled Time 
Series Tests with an Application to the PPP Hypothesis. Econometric Theory, Vol. 3, pp. 579–625. 
Phillips P.C.B. and Moon H.R. (1999). Linear regression limit theory for no stationary panel data. 
Econometrica, 67, pp. 1057-1111.  
Phillips, P. (1992). Hyper-Consistent Estimation of a Unit Root in Time Series Regression. Cowles 
Foundation Discussion Papers, No. 1040. 
Phillips, P., and Hansen, B. (1990). .Statistical Inference in Instrumental Variables Regression with I 
(1) Processes. Review of Economic Studies, 57, 99–125. 
  
